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This paper tries to document Husserl’s reflections on the problem of “situations” in his 
later manuscripts of the 1930s. These reflections are centered on the phenomenon of 
“typificiation”, which plays an important part in Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. Thus, 
the paper starts by sketching out a general presentation of “typification” in its relation to 
expectation and habit. By defining situation as “the intentional living unity of horizontal 
context and subjective potentiality”, the paper then tries to follow husserl’s exposition 
of three essential aspects of situational typification: a.) the habituality of interest; b.) 
normality and c.) periodicity.
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in several of his early Freiburg lectures, martin heidegger analysed the 
concept of “situation” as a basic structure of factical life, claiming that: “The 
problem of situation was until now never actually posed in philosophical 
literature without being objectified.”1 his critique, primarily aimed at 
Karl Jaspers’ Psychologie der Weltanschaungen, also touched upon his own 
treatment of the issue in one of his very first lectures, as it ran the risk – in 
heidegger’s own opinion – of regarding situations merely as a “spatio-
temporal order” to be charted in light of a “typology of situations” (Typik 
der Situationen). Obviously influenced by Heidegger’s early lectures, Günther 
anders defended his dissertation in 1923 with husserl under the title: 
die rolle der Situationskategorie bei den “logischen Sätzen”. The dissertation 
was, as anders recalls, driven by the intention to criticize husserl from 
a heideggerian perspective, by focusing on a concept that was ostensibly 
lacking in husserlian phenomenology, namely, “situation”. The following 
paper tries to give a detailed account of husserl’s attempts to catch up 
with this phenomenon in his later work of the 1930s. The reference to 
heidegger and anders proves relevant not so much because husserl might 
have been directly inspired by them in his treatment of the subject matter, 
but especially because his analyses focus exactly on the question of 
“typification”. I will start by offering a general presentation of “typification” 
in its relation to expectation and habit (1.), then i will try to work out a more 
comprehensive concept of “situation” based on several of husserl’s writings 
(2.), after which i will follow husserl’s exposition of various aspects of 
situational typification (3.).  
“a cognitive function bearing on individual objects of experience is never 
carried out as if these objects were pregiven for the very first time, as some 
completely undetermined substrates.”2 according to this abrupt statement 
in husserl’s experience and Judgment, nothing we encounter in our experience 
actually presents itself as completely novel, given in an absolute first 
impression. on the contrary, even if the object is entirely unfamiliar as 
such, it is always still perceived as something, as an individual object, e.g., as 
a living being or as a strange piece of machinery. it is always experienced 
in the light of some pre-cognition, while it is precisely this aspect that 
1  heidegger (1993), p. 258 (my translation).
2  husserl (1999), p. 26 (english translation: p. 31).
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Husserl most often addresses with his concept of “typification”. In Husserl’s 
view, “typification” thus designates the epistemic process by which the 
acquisitions from prior experience determine our ongoing encounter 
with things: “With each new kind of object constituted for the first time 
(genetically speaking), a new type of object is permanently prescribed, in 
terms of which other objects similar to it will be apprehended in advance.”3 
On several occasions, “types” are defined by Husserl as empirical 
generalities4. also termed as „morphological essences“, such generalities are 
– already in the ideas i – contrasted to the “ideal essences” of mathematics, 
stemming from a quite different process of ideation5. according to husserl’s 
genetic phenomenology, these empirical generalities are fully constituted 
– as general conceptual cores – only by means of an active performance 
of judgment6, and it is of course only at this superior level of conceptual 
expression that we actually recognize, for example, a dog as a “dog”, a phone 
as a “phone,” and a toy as a “toy”. however, this intellectual performance 
is itself, as husserl shows, primarily grounded in a layer of passive, 
experiential pre-constitution. To be more precise, types as empirical concepts 
require as their foundation individual objects encountered in perceptive 
experience with typical characters of acquaintance or familiarity7, while in 
husserl’s notations these characters are themselves also often referred to as 
“types”. Thus, we can generally distinguish between a predicative and a pre-
predicative acceptation of “types”, while our following reflections will focus 
mostly on the latter.  
when considered in this primary, experiential acceptation, types are above 
all a phenomenon of expectation. To be typically acquainted with an object 
thus actually means to anticipate it according to an earlier experience. 
Therefore, it is precisely in the course of a genetic theory of expectation that 
husserl comes to elaborate on the problem of types in his famous lectures 
on “passive synthesis”8. certainly, in husserl’s view expectations are not 
related to future events alone, as they can also refer to aspects of present 
objects not yet fully given in experience or even to aspects of the past9. For 
instance, when we approach an unknown crossroad, we only see a part of 
our path ahead, while we do not yet know in detail how the rest will be. 
however, this unseen part of our path is, as husserl stresses, anticipated 
3  husserl (1999), p. 35 (english translation: p. 38). For husserl’s concept of type, see also lohmar (2003).
4  See husserl (1999), § 81.
5  husserl (1976)2, p. 155 (english translation: p. 166). 
6  husserl (1999), p. 382 (english translation: p. 386).
7  husserl (1999), p. 382 (english translation: p. 386).
8  husserl (1966), pp. 184-191 (english translation: pp. 235-242).
9  husserl (1966), p. 185 (english translation: p. 235).
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in a “typical” fashion: we generally expect there to be houses, roads, cars, 
people, etc. This “generality” – that motivates husserl to regard such 
expectational characteristics of typical acquaintance as “preliminary forms 
of concepts” – is itself by no means yet of a conceptual nature, as it merely 
indicates the vagueness of such expectations, i.e., the fact that they can be 
intuitively individualized with equal justification in manifold variants10. it is 
precisely this aspect that Husserl indicates when defining experiential types 
as open “ranges of manifold possibilities”11. concepts are in husserl’s view 
essentially rooted in the vagueness of our expectations.
on several occasions, husserl formulates the a priori law governing the 
formation of expectations as follows: “Something similar recalls something 
else that is similar, but it also allows something similar to be expected 
in coexistence as in succession.”12 due to this “apperceptive transfer,”13 
every object of our present experience simultaneously 1) recalls similar 
past experiences and 2) is itself anticipated in analogy with them. This 
double movement of evocation and anticipation, characterizing our 
typified experience of objects, is determined by Husserl as an “assimilating 
apperception”14 (assimilierende apperzeption). and it is indeed a process of 
typical assimilation that accounts for the fact that, as husserl expresses 
it, “the future always leads us back to the past”15, since all expectations 
necessarily echo implicit horizons of recollection. often enough, 
husserl considers this process of passive assimilation to be the most 
original, experiential form of “induction”16, while it is precisely at this 
point in the lectures on passive synthesis that he also establishes an 
essential connection between typification and habit. For, if the concept 
of “typification” primarily refers to the inductive anticipations that 
continuously arise within our ongoing experience determining our 
recognition of all encountered objects and persons, than these expectations 
can themselves obviously become gradually stronger or weaker depending 
on how often they are confirmed or disconfirmed by experience: “the force 
of this apperceptive expectation increases with the number of ‘instances’ 
– or with habit [gewohnheit], which amounts to the same thing.”17 Thus, the 
problem of typification is generally to be regarded as an integral part of 
10  husserl (1999), pp. 31-32 (english translation: pp. 35-36).
11  husserl (1966), p. 41 (english translation: p. 79).
12  husserl (1966), p. 185 (english translation: p. 235).
13  See for instance husserl (2008), p. 431.
14  husserl (2008), p. 436.
15  husserl (2006), p. 285, (my translation).
16  husserl (1999), p. 28 (english translation: p. 33).
17  husserl (1966), p. 190 (english translation: p. 240). For a more detailed and contextual 
reading of husserl’s conception of habit, see also moran (2011).
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husserl’s theory of habituality: types are the correlates of epistemic habits.
Surely, according to Husserl’s use of the term “typification”, these 
observations should apply not only to individual substrates of experience, 
but also to “situations”. But what exactly is a “situation”? in a notation from 
1931 – first published under the title “die Welt der lebendigen gegenwart und 
die Konstitution der ausserleiblichen umwelt” – husserl discusses situations 
beforehand as configurations. The latter are, in short, examples of complex 
intentional pluralities. Such pluralities were already touched upon in the 
ideas i as products of an active “articulated” or “polythetic” synthesis, which 
– as Husserl discovered – was not specific to the sphere of judgement alone, 
but could also be found in the lower spheres of perceptive, emotional or 
practical experience18. moreover, as husserl shows in his later genetic work, 
synthetic articulations already occur in the sphere of passivity, for instance 
in the primary constitution of the sensuous fields out of which individual 
objects later on emerge19. Defined as “configurations of sensual data”, these 
fields are initially produced by means of an “associative genesis” following 
the similarities (homogeneities) and dissimilarities (heterogeneities) of 
sensuous affectation. However, in Husserl’s view, configurations are not 
constituted passively on the ground of affective pairing and contrast 
alone. on the contrary, in the lectures courses on “passive synthesis”, their 
constitution is also linked to the question of assimilative apperceptions 
and expectations. Thus, the nexus that binds together the terms of a 
configuration, Husserl here claims, “is not merely a nexus with respect 
to content […] but rather apart from affective motivation, which governs 
selectively in the configuration. (Various figures could have been formed 
out of the chaos, and could still be formed, but the path of awakening that 
was privileged favored the path of special unifications of a lower and higher 
level up to the entire configuration in question.)”20 in husserl’s view, every 
configuration that was once constituted in our earlier experience motivates 
us in our ongoing experience to appercieve similar configurations:
if a plurality of data emerge in the same present as it continues to 
develop, data that can go together with the configuration in question, 
then the entire configurations in question will be awakened by the 
awakening that reaches back and that issues from the particularities. 
And these configurations radiating ahead in a protentional-
18  husserl (1976)2, § 118.
19  husserl (1999), §16.
20  husserl (1966), p. 191 (english translation: p. 241).
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expectational manner will awaken the projected image or model 
of this configuration, allowing it to be expected, and through this 
the coalescence of the configuration will simultaneously be favored 
once more as fulfillment. In this way, the anticipation is at work 
‘apperceptively,’ it is co-productive in the configuration of the 
coexisting objects.21 
These observations could also be applied to situations which husserl often 
addresses as typically repeatable configurative phenomena. However, 
it is important to notice here that, when generally speaking about the 
apperceptive recognition of configurations in his analyses concerning 
passive syntheses, husserl is referring solely to individual “self-contained 
configurations given to consciousness”22 – that is: to mere particular 
sets of objects or data grouped within a wider frame of consciousness – 
whereas the situation is not an individual configuration among others but a 
“Gesamtkonfiguration”23, a totality-configuration encompassing the ensemble 
of a subject’s lived circumstances in a given moment. This totality is often 
also termed by husserl as “the living present”. “each present is a situation”, 
he claims in his aforementioned notation from 1931, adding just a few lines 
further down: “all that is experienced together as coexisting in the unity of 
a living present has as its unity the situation”24. certainly, such a unity is, 
as several thinkers have pointed out25, not really “self-contained” (except 
perhaps in hindsight, when the formerly lived situation is narrated to others 
as an anecdote), but necessarily elusive and open. moreover, by generally 
defining the situation as a “configuration”, Husserl also seems to neglect an 
important aspect of situations that he himself stumbles upon in a marginal 
note to his lectures on passive synthesis, i.e., our own freedom of action. in 
his brief note, husserl draws attention to the fact that, when analysing the 
constitution of the “living present”, one should not forget the correlation 
between a subject’s momentary field of consciousness and his kinesthetic 
possibilities of movement26. This idea is expanded upon in a brief addendum 
to the lecture, introducing a significant conceptual distinction between 
proper “expectations” (here defined as the line of prefigurations that follows 
the trajectory of the subject’s actual kinesthetic movements) and mere 
“potential expectations” (conceived as simple associative intentions that would 
21  husserl (1966), p. 190 (english translation: pp. 240-241).
22  husserl (1966), p. 187 (english translation: pp. 237-238).
23  husserl (1946), p. 336.
24  husserl (1946), p. 334, (my translation).
25  See, for instance, Jaspers (1932), pp. 202-203.
26  husserl (1966), p. 185, n. 1 (english translation: p. 236, n. 1).
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become proper expectations if the subject would assume the corresponding 
kinesthetic trajectory).27 Thus, if one really wants to discuss situations 
as apperceptive unities of typification, it is by no means sufficient to regard 
them merely as configurative totalities of circumstances, but – by focusing on the 
essential connection between apperceptive expectations and subjective 
potentialities – one has to correlatively address them as totalities of potentiality. 
on several occasions, husserl touches upon these intuitions in his various 
writings on kinaesthesia, starting from the lecture course of the summer 
semester 1907, Thing and Space. most often here, he uses the concept of 
“kinesthetic situation” to designate the totality of a subject’s momentary 
possibilities of bodily movement. in this sense, the term “situation” is 
employed mostly – as becomes apparent in one of the supplements to 
his 1907 lectures – to designate the practically charged noetic correlate 
to the noematic “orientation” of objects.28 in the Crisis-work, however, 
husserl uses the term “situation”, while discussing the phenomenon of 
kinaesthesia, alternatively, to designate both the noetic system of our 
kinesthetic possibilities (that is: the “kinaesthetic situation”29) and their 
corresponding noematic configurations of circumstances (the “situation 
of appearances” [erscheinungssituation]30, as he terms it). This ambivalence 
is telling. For, if we consider that, 1) already in his earliest notations on 
kinaesthesia, husserl repeatedly draws attention to the “apperceptive 
unity” (auffassungseinheit) binding together our possibilities of movement, 
on the one hand, and the corresponding configurations of phenomenal 
circumstances, on the other31, and 2) if we also consider that – while 
situations are indeed, as “totality-configurations”, products of apperceptive 
expectations – expectations themselves are, as husserl shows, functions of 
our free posibilities of movement and action, then 3) we can  legitimately 
identify precisely in this “apperceptive unity” the key to a more accurate 
and complete phenomenological concept of “situation”. a situation would be in 
this sense the intentional living unity of horizonal context and subjective potentiality. 
Significantly, this acceptation of the term would not only correspond 
perfectly to the classical concept of “situation”, as developed later on in 
“existentialist” and hermeneutic philosophy (by Jaspers, heidegger, or 
Sartre), where it is regarded as a unity of subjective and objective elements, 
but it could actually help give this (often quite vague) concept a more 
27  husserl (1966), pp. 428-429 (english translation: pp. 534-536). Thus, we have actual 
expectations concerning the content of our mailbox when we reach out to open it, while we have 
mere potential expectations when we pass it with no intention of looking inside.
28  husserl (1973)1, p. 299. 
29  husserl (1976)1, p. 108.
30  husserl (1976)1, p. 109.
31  cf. husserl (1973)1, p. 187 et. al. 
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precise interpretation. “The situation,” Sartre writes in a famous passage 
of Being and nothingness, “is the common product of the contingency of the 
in-itself and of freedom”32. husserl himself reaches a similar concept of 
situation in several of his notations of the 1930s, by explicitly conceiving it 
as the concrete lived “horizon of the practical agent”33, wherein meaningful 
circumstances and momentary possibilities of action are concatenated. 
now, certainly, there is nothing bewildering in saying that, in our normal 
practical experience, we encounter typically similar constellations of 
circumstances, such as the supermarket, the elevator, the postal office, the 
airport, the hospital, etc. However, if one defines “situations” as functional 
concatenations of noematic circumstances and noetic potentialities, the idea 
of a “typification of situations” might appear somewhat more problematic. To 
this extent, it is crucial to point out that, indeed, in husserl’s view, the process 
of typification does not refer solely to objects and configurations, but in a 
similar fashion also to practical interests, actions and possibilities. 
in fact, the very genesis of “practical possibilities” – a term husserl uses to 
designate the subjective phenomena of the “i can” – is grounded in such 
a process34. For – as husserl shows with regard to kinaesthesia, the most 
elementary potentiality of bodily movement – such possibilities are from 
the onset formed as acquisitions from prior experience. every infant has to 
“learn” not only how to walk, but also how to move his head, hands and eyes, 
movements that gradually become his “practical possibilities”. in several 
notations of the 1930s, husserl discusses the formation of such possibilities 
by showing how they emerge from a prior stage of merely instinctive, 
uncoordinated movement. in this context, concepts like “instinct” and 
“drive” designate a yearning “that still lacks the representation of its 
target“35, while it is precisely through their crystallisation as practical 
possibilities that such movements become controllable as actual targets 
of the subject’s will. husserl describes this process in more detail by 
referring to the example of a baby learning to nurse: while the scent of his 
mother’s breast elicits an “originally adapted kinaesthesis”36, his instinctive 
movements gradually come to acquire – once they are periodically 
repeated – “the unity of an oriented intention”37. husserl offers similar 
32  Sartre (1992), p. 488.
33  husserl (2008), p. 543.
34  with regard to husserl’s concept of “practical posibilities” see also: mohanty (1984), aguirre 
(1991) and Ferencz-Flatz (2012).
35  husserl (2006), p. 326, (my translation).
36  husserl (2006), p. 326, (my translation).
37  husserl (2006), p. 327, (my translation).
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reflections in relation to feet-kicking (Strampel-Kinästhesen)38. in husserl’s 
writings, this entire development is often regarded in perfect analogy to 
the apperceptive typification of objects. For, if epistemic apperceptions are 
generally conditioned by the repeated encounter of similar objects, practical 
posibilities are themselves similarly conditioned by the repeated execution 
of actions and movements. husserl terms the latter “exercise” (Übung), 
explicitly considering it to be a practical equivalent of association39. of 
couse, similar processes of practical association also lead to the formation 
of more complex practical posibilities, while husserl himself often stresses 
their contribution to the articulation of kinaesthetic systems: “here, one 
thinks of the remarkable associations, due to which kinaestheses are 
‘associated’ not as mere immanent data, but as practical potentialities (‘i can 
turn this or that way’), building a practical system.”40 
Processes of typification, on the other hand, do not affect a subject’s 
practical experience only by shaping the possibilities of his free activity 
out of the “primary passivity” of his instinctive drive responses. on the 
contrary, they also determine the manner in which this free activity itself 
constantly lapses back into a corresponding “secondary passivity”41. The 
repeated performance of an action, which husserl calls  “exercise”, proves 
central in this respect as well, since, by being repeated as such, an action 
becomes more than a possible target of free will – it also and necessarily 
becomes an object of habit, allowing for its merely automatic execution: 
“generally, the transformations which occur in the case of repeated 
actions in relation to repeated goals are the work of exercise and habit. 
Traditionalising is after all nothing other than a transforming of the 
originally explicit orientation towards a goal into an implicit one, and of the 
implicit one into a forgetfulness of the goal.”42 as is well known, the problem 
of “habit” was already in aristotle’s view considered  indispensable for the 
understanding of human action. in his nicomachean ethics, aristotle claimed 
that the manner in which a subject acts simultaneously determines his habit 
to act in that precise manner43, while this habitual side of action was also 
supposed to account for his ethical behavior in dreams44. Similarly, in the 
second book of his ideas, husserl claims – while generally designating free 
acts as “position takings” – that “with each position-taking, there develop 
38  husserl (2006), p. 327.
39  See husserl (1952), p. 330 (english translation: p. 342); husserl (2006), p. 328; husserl (2008), p. 
358.
40  husserl (2008), p. 12.
41  See for this distinction husserl (1999), § 67 b.
42  husserl (2008), p. 890, note to p. 527, (my translation).   
43  aristotle (2009), 1103a-1104b.
44  aristotle (2009), 1102b.
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‘tendencies’ to take up the same position under similar circumstances”.45 
This statement does not refer, as one might think, exclusively to the sphere 
of judgments, assessing given objects in the light of earlier experiences, but 
also to practical and emotional acts, as husserl explicitly speaks of “habits of 
feeling, desire and will”, especially insisting on the phenomenon of habitual 
behavior46. in husserl’s view, habitual action is not merely, as according 
to aristotle, an action that conforms to the habitual dispositions of the 
practical agent, but primarily an action that tends to become unfree and 
“mechanical” by no longer requiring his conscious attention47. To designate 
this specific type of action, Husserl was later on to coin the idea of an “action 
prior to attention” (Tun vor der Zuwendung)48, that responds to impulses 
automatically, in reflex without paying any attention to them. Without yet 
using this term, husserl already describes the very same phenomenon on 
several accounts in his ideas ii – in explicit reference to the reflex gesture 
of lighting a cigarette – by speaking of an “associative” or “reproductive” 
tendency of action49. 
now, while husserl’s earlier considerations thus regard the habitual 
typifications of praxis exclusively with regard to the noetic posisbilities 
and tendencies of the practical agent, a long series of notations from the 
1930s attempts to engage similar reflections by approaching the subject 
matter from the onset in the broader correlative perspective of a typification 
of practical situations. in the following, i will simply try to map out these 
considerations by following three key issues which seem to structure these 
efforts: a.) the habituality of interest; b.) normality and c.) periodicity.  
If Husserl generally defines “interest” as the practical noetic engagement 
of the i50, his later notations most often tend to approach this phenomenon 
by regarding practical interests in their correlation to the world as they 
noematically apprehend it. This correlation is from the onset considered 
in the perspective of a typical repetition of situations: “Situations repeat 
themselves as similar, while to the habituality of interests there corresponds 
the world passively appercieved as structured in significance.”51 To this 
extent, husserl often distinguishes between the particular, momentary 
45  husserl (1952), p. 280 (english translation: p. 293). 
46  See husserl (1952), p. 256 and 277 (english translation: p. 269 and 289).
47  as an excellent illustration of how habitual action is generally performed one can think 
of the manner in which we normally run through a well-familiar path without paying any 
conscious attention to our surroundings. 
48  husserl (1999), p. 91 (english translation: p. 85).
49  husserl (1952), p. 338 (english translation: p. 350).
50  husserl (2008), p. 589.
51  husserl (1973)2, p. 55, (my translation).
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interests of the subject and his universal, habitual interest horizons, 
illustrating this distinction on the example of professional interest:
during the actual work-life of the businessman (‘in the company’), his 
particular business-interest is momentarily actual, while throughout 
his momentary interests we constantly find the unity of his 
“professional interest”. The momentarily actual interest designates, 
in its relation to the grounding world of praxis, the situation; this 
applies for every waking man understood in his own situation, for the 
clerk in his office, for the member of Parliament in his parliamentary 
business, for the housewife in her business as a housewife, say on the 
market in a market-situation.52
according to husserl, the subject’s momentary, particular constellation of 
interests is constantly determined by his enduring life-interests, be they 
directed, as in the earlier examples, towards one’s profession, or on the 
contrary, towards one’s family, nation and so on. in husserl’s view, interests 
of this sort are necessarily manifold, thus constituting the different layers 
of the subject’s personality, while to each one of his habitual sphere of 
interest there corresponds a variety of goals (i.e. explicitly shaped out 
and willfully pursued “practical possibilities”), “more or less completely 
organised in the unity of one goal”53. certainly, this latter thesis might 
be somewhat problematic, but in the view of the present paper it is less 
important to see whether or not the subject’s goals are indeed organized in 
a coherent fashion, as it is to notice that, according to husserl’s conception, 
goals are as such generally conditioned by a situation that guarantees 
their motivational basis: “goals are goals only with respect to a motivating 
situation in which they have their apodictic validity.”54
 moreover, in husserl’s view, goals and interests always have 
corresponding noematic apperceptions of the world as their necessary 
correlate object. To this extent, husserl often distinguishes between the 
scientific ascertainment of an object “once and for all” and its practical 
ascertainment, “serving only the purpose of transitory practical goals, in 
the perspective of a certain situation or a multiplicity of typically similar 
situations”55. husserl illustrates this by discussing the utility of a tool – 
apprehended as useful in anticipation of a recurring situation in which it 
comes handy – but the same also applies for any value-determination in 
52  husserl (1973)2, p. 415, (my translation).
53  husserl (1973)2, p. 415, (my translation).
54  husserl (2008), p. 774, (my translation).
55  husserl (1999), p. 65. 
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general: “every ascertainment of values and practical characters of things 
is relative to the situation in which they are valuable and of practical use.”56 
ascertainments of this sort – say, of a joke being funny – are for sure not 
universally valid like theoretical determinations, but they still transcend 
the sheer individual moment by referring to a typically repeatable situation 
of their possible verification. A similar observation is made with respect 
to significance (Bedeutsamkeit): “Characters of significance are habitual 
apperceptive characters pertaining to objects; they are apperceived 
enduringly as characters ascertained solely in a certain known context of 
interest and in corresponding situations, when they manifest this precise 
practical configuration”.57 as the practical agent is thus engaged in his 
particular practical situation, his surrounding world is noematically 
apprehended by him, according to Husserl, as a typically prefigured and 
articulated ensemble of significance, with its different layers of situational 
circumstances corresponding to his manifold spheres of goals, interests and 
possibilities. From this perspective, the concrete structure of a practical 
situation is, in husserl’s view, essentially determined by “relevance”: “when 
we speak about the changing circumstances of action and the ‘interests’  
functioning within them (in the situations of the practical agent), we think 
of the agent in his experientially […] given surrounding world, in which 
what is practically relevant for his intention is distinctly emphasized.”58 
This distinction – between what is relevant and what is irrelevant in a 
certain practical situation – represents an indispensable condition for any 
conscious human action and reaction within it, while it is precisely because, 
according to husserl, such a distinction is essentially grounded on the 
typical recognition of the respective situation as, e.g., a “market-situation”, 
an “office situation” and so on, that the question of situational typifications 
proves central for a phenomenology of action as such. Practical possibilities 
and typically recognizable situations are co-constitutive phenomena.
as is well known, the concept of “normality” is initially used by husserl 
in relation to what he terms as “psycho-physical conditionalities”59: the 
conditional correlation between the physiological state of the subject’s 
body and the constitution of his perceived objects. in this context, husserl 
contrasts the case of “orthoaesthetic” (normal) perception, wherein 
the subject’s sense organs function concordantly, with the case of an 
56  husserl (1999), p. 65. 
57  husserl (1973)2, p. 55, n. 2, (my translation);
58  husserl (2008), p. 201, (my translation).
59  husserl (1952), p. 62 (english translation: p. 67). For a more detailed account of husserl’s 
concept of normality, see also gyllenhammer (2009) and Taipale (2012).
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abnormally functioning organ. later on, this model of synaesthetic 
collaboration also serves husserl as a paradigm for understanding the 
more complex processes of intersubjective experiential cooperation, 
leading to a wider use of the term “normality”. Following this implicit 
analogy between the synaesthetic and the intersubjective concordance 
and discordance of experience60, husserl often illustrates the question of 
normality and anomaly by addressing the intersubjective status of sheer 
sensory dysfunctions like colourblindness. Thus, he claims that “normality” 
primarily refers to an “optimal” standard of intersubjective experience and 
not to the mere contingencies of a statistical majority61. however, several of 
his later writings come to challenge this clear cut conception of “normality”, 
sketching out a more historically relative interpretation. Thus, in a 
notations from 1931, Husserl explicitly defines normality as “averageness” 
(durchschnittlichkeit)62, while in another text he regards it as a voluntarily 
assumed “norm”: “man in his normal existence doesn’t merely behave 
typically similar under typically similar conditions, like a mere thing 
apprehended in its empirical, inductive facticity; man lives under a norm, 
by becoming conscious of that norm. The normal lifestyle as a style of social 
life is not merely a fact for him, but something that ought to be”63. This 
normative character of a “normal lifestyle” is, for sure, not grounded in an 
actual, rationally motivated choice or preference. husserl himself explicitly 
refers it, in another note, to tradition and habituality64, regarding normality 
in this sense as a correlative concept that comprises both the noetic customs 
regulating the personal life of the subject as well as the noematic customary 
determinations of his lived world.65 moreover, by interpreting tradition in 
general as a “socialized practical habit”66, husserl actually comes to claim 
that all habits hold as such a “secondary normativity”67, since they are not 
experienced by the subject as plain facts, but on the contrary as actual 
commitments of the will, even if they are assumed by him only in a passive 
and unconscious manner. habits are mandatory, and the “secondary
60  husserl explicitly adresses this analogy in a notation from 1921, published as Beilage li, 
under the title „Solitäre und intersubjektive normalität“ in husserl (2008), p. 649. The same 
analogy is also central for merleau-Ponty’s theory of “intercorporeality”; see for instance 
merleau-Ponty (1960), pp. 258-275.
61  husserl (2008), p. 658.
62  husserl (1973)2, p. 231.
63  husserl (1973)2, pp. 143-144, (my translation).
64  husserl (1973)2, p. 143.
65  husserl (1973)2, p. 144. 
66  husserl (2008), p. 527. 
67  “To every habit there pertains a secondary form of normativity [Sekundärform des Sollens], so 
that deviations from it are experienced from the onset as something that ‘ought not be’”. husserl 
(2008), p. 527.
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 normativity” of normality is precisely the secondary passivity of a practical 
preference in an intersubjective, generative context.  
it is precisely this latter acceptation of “normality” that also reoccurs 
in several of husserl’s later manuscripts that attempt to address the 
“typification of situations” in the perspective of intersubjectivity. For 
indeed, according to husserl, individual concrete situations are from the 
onset linked intersubjectively: “all situations stand in an intersubjective 
nexus, that implies an intersubjective simultaneity and succession, a 
concrete intersubjective time, understood as a form comprising everything 
as it is intersubjectively interlaced or better even: interfused.”68 already 
in his ideas ii, husserl regarded the understanding of others basically as 
an understanding of their situation69, conceiving the latter primarily as 
the horizon of their determinant motivations. later notations, from the 
1920s and 30s, shift the main point of interest from the empathic givenness 
of the other’s motivations to the typical similarities between one’s own 
and the other’s situation. in husserl’s view, it is precisely this mutual 
correspondence between our individual situations that generally allows us 
to access the situation of others and to be grasped in our own by them, thus 
grounding a specific sense of social normality. in his formal and Transcendental 
logic, he explicitly considers that “the single subject’s and the community’s 
entire daily life” is related “to a typical specific likeness among situations 
[...], such that any normal human being who enters a particular situation 
has, by the very fact of being normal, the situational horizons belonging 
to it and common to all.”70 Therefore, by being apprehended according 
to a shared typology, all normal individual situations are from the onset 
open to mutual understanding, even if this understanding can become 
factically problematic. although husserl terminologically distinguishes 
between “private” situations, pertaining to the individual alone, and 
“common”, social situations, in which  “the situations of the participants are 
synthetically unified”71, he also illustrates their necessary linkage by again 
evoking the example of clerks in a company. For, indeed, the individual 
situations of such employees are, in their own perspective, enclosed in 
the broader situation of the company itself, while all individual situations 
finally share as their overarching common horizon the world regarded as 
the ultimate reference of their intersubjective connection: “The enduring 
style in which this world exists and its very being itself are actual only in 
the form of a temporality, in which socialized human subjects live alongside 
68  husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).
69  husserl (1952), p. 275.
70  husserl (1974), p. 207 (english translation: p. 199).
71  husserl (2008), p. 196, (my translation).
A PHENOMENOlOgy Of AUTOMATISM
chriSTian FerencZ-FlaTZ alexandru dragomir institute for Philosophy, Bucharest
78
one another and with one another in situations, each in his own momentary 
situation as well as in the universal horizon of his life situation” – that 
is: the world.72 Following such assumptions, husserl sees it as a chief task 
of phenomenology to explicate “the universal structure of this lifeworld 
as an invariant form for all”, “as an enduring unity that comprises all 
situations”73, while the lifeworld is conceived in this context as “the world 
of normal citizens” [bürgerliche normalwelt]. within its scope, every other 
citizen is as such typically predetermined for me:
if i as a citizen [als bürgerliches ich] analyse this situation of mine, it 
proves to be that of a citizen placed in the unity of a surrounding civil 
world. Thus the world has this sense as a horizon for me as it does for 
anyone else pertaining to it as a co-citizen, be it that he is given to me 
horizontally as someone familiar (my friend, my buisness partner, my 
faculty colleague etc.), if i know him individually, or else merely as 
part of the vast and open horizon of unknown co-citizens. The latter 
have their own predelineated personal sense of being, belonging just 
as well, in their own way, to this civil world of mine.74
Such normality surely also implies a corresponding typical anomaly, and it 
is perhaps at this point that Husserl’s reflections become most problematic:
in my normal civil life there is emphasis on a certain style of 
normal civil life, belonging especially to my class, my profession, 
as this stands out among other professions of civil life, sharing, in 
the manner of a different horizon, the same common lifeworld, as 
one and the same world that is only given in a different mode. This 
again leads to different types of situations. at their outskirts there 
is the abnormal, the vagabonds, the rascals and so on, understood as 
personal types that place themselves outside the normal world.75
    
In several of his notes from the 1930s, Husserl relates the specific time flow 
of situational life to the manner in which our dominant practical interests 
succeed each other and interfere with one another76. most frequently, such 
considerations are illustrated by following the alternation between the 
72  husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).
73  husserl (2008), p. 196, (my translation). 
74  husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).
75  husserl (2008), p. 198, (my translation).
76  husserl (1973)2, p. 174.
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professional interest that dominates our “work hours” and other interests 
– of play, leisure, or spontaneous curiosity – that interrupt and complete 
it77. This alternation is from the onset characterized by a certain typical 
periodicity, a concept that becomes central in several of husserl’s later, 
genetic considerations. According to these reflections, the periodicity of 
practical interests is, on the one hand, linked to the natural periodicities of 
the surrounding world (the alternation of night and day, of seasons in a year) 
as it is, on the other hand, primarily rooted in the biological periodicities of 
instinct. in the periodical succession of sleep and waking, for instance, both 
aspects – drive and a natural cycle – are obviously intertwined. however, 
in husserl’s view, an instinctive drive like hunger doesn’t simply reoccur 
periodically, but it is also consciously apprehended by the subject in its 
periodical, typical repetition. By this, the drive itself is modified, remaining 
horizonally open for further reoccurrences with each of its momentary 
fulfillments and thus it helps constitute a broader practical horizon of 
the will: a “synthetic unity of need”78. in husserl’s view, this elementary 
periodicity of instincts actually represents “the necessary starting point for 
understanding all goal-orientation of human life”79, and it is in such primary 
horizons of periodical repeatability that the very possibility of “foresight” – 
that is: of deliberate action and conscious planning – is generally rooted80. 
This very conception of periodicity also becomes central in husserl’s 
reflections on the typification of situations. For situations are indeed, above 
all, finite temporal sequences, subjected to complex processes of time-
organisation. This aspect is explicitly sketched out in a manuscript from 
1932, addressing situations from the onset in terms of their “normal” typical 
repeatability. Situations are, as husserl claims, essentially apprehended 
as parts of normal, typically repeatable successions of situations, that is, 
of predictable sequential arrangements. he illustrates this in a striking 
description of daily routine: “i have just woken up, and the day, my day, is 
already present in front of me, without me having to represent it intuitively 
as such; the succession of its normal, usual, particular situations already 
occurs to me in the flow of their being actualized as such: bathing, getting 
clothed, breakfast, morning work in the office or in the shop, lunch break, 
afternoon work, evening leasure.”81 Thus, any normal concrete situation 
is as such horizonally integrated in a vaster temporal sequence that 
77  See husserl (2008), p. 307.
78  husserl (2008), p. 581, (my translation).
79  husserl (2008), p. 583, (my translation).
80  husserl (2008), p. 585.
81  husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).
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predetermines it from the start: “instead, the particular situation, for 
instance the situation of a particular morning of the week, already implies, 
with its mere apprehension as a morning situation, its precise sense as 
an introduction for the following:  the work in the office with its familiar 
and articulated style, as well as the entire following flow of situations that 
normally constitute a day of the week.”82 moreover, this entire sequence 
of situations is itself anticipated as belonging to an even wider timeframe, 
namely, the overall periodicity of world-time: “But moreover, according to 
its horizonal sense, the day of the week belongs to the overall order of the 
days of the week. Therefore, each week already implies, with its end of the 
week, the following Sunday, as well as the entire periodicity of weeks in a 
year, etc.”83 Thus, according to husserl, overarching periodical rhythms of 
succession constantly define and anticipate our ongoing normal situation 
in its concrete deployment as such. in this perspective, our practical future 
proves to be from the onset mapped out not only by our active planning 
and scheduling, but before all by passive processes of routine formation that 
automatically chart out all our practical intentions. and it is precisely these 
habit driven situational routines – as specific phenomena of a “typification 
of situations” – that offer, in husserl’s view, the necessary experiential 
background for free, deliberate action and foresight. 
For sure, the concept “situation” is most commonly associated with so-called 
“existentialist” philosophy, i.e. with the writings of Jaspers, heidegger or Sartre, 
who emphatically relate it to the question of freedom. according to Sartre, for 
instance, the situation is “the contingency of freedom in the plenum of being of 
the world inasmuch as this datum, which is there only in order not to constrain 
freedom, is revealed to this freedom only as already illuminated by the end 
which freedom chooses.”84 Similarly, heidegger emphasizes, in Being and Time, 
the fact that a “situation” only persists as such for a subject that is capable of 
assuming the autonomous state of “resoluteness”85. in this context, both Sartre 
and heidegger tend to regard the situation as a primary limitation for freedom, in 
relation to which freedom is always bound to assert itself. as such, it delivers the 
very material out of which freedom can concretely shape its choices. Thus, Sartre 
claims: “empirically we can be free only in relation to a state of things and in spite 
of this state of things. i will be said to be free in relation to this state of things 
when it does not constrain me. Thus the empirical and practical concept of 
82  husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).
83  husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).
84  Sartre (1992), p. 487.
85  heidegger (1967), p. 300 (english translation: p. 276).
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freedom is wholly negative; it issues from the consideration of a situation and 
establishes that this situation leaves me free to pursue this or that end. one 
might say even that this situation conditions my freedom in this sense, that 
the situation is there in order not to constrain me.”86 Similarly, by conceiving 
the dasein as a “thrown projection”, heidegger explicitly regards the situation 
as an element of determinant facticity, that freedom has to take on: “when 
da-sein, anticipating, lets death become powerful in itself, as free for death 
it understands itself in its own higher power, the power of its finite freedom, 
and takes over the powerlessness of being abandoned to itself in that freedom, 
which always only is in having chosen the choice, and becomes clear about the 
chance elements in the situation disclosed.”87 
husserl’s own considerations tend to focus on a quite different aspect of 
the phenomenon, namely: the inherent unfreedom of freedom itself, as it 
becomes manifest in the flow of practical situations. No doubt, the specifics 
of this perspective are already visible in the conception of freedom put forth 
in his ideas ii. For, in spite of husserl’s recurrent attempts here to establish a 
clear cut distinction between the free acts of the subject, on the one hand, 
also termed “cogitationes”88, and his unfree dimensions of sheer “nature”, 
as husserl calls them, on the other hand, among which he also ranks habit, 
he nevertheless repeatedly arrives at relativising this differentiation, by 
speaking of the habitual, inertial tendencies that also govern the sphere of 
free acts. “[e]ach free act has it’s comet’s tail of nature,”89 husserl claims, and 
it is precisely in view of this comet’s tail of automatism – their “repetition 
compulsion” – that his later notes also seem to regard the phenomenon of 
practical situations by insisting on their typicalrepeatability. Thus, situations 
appear not only in view of a “primary passivity” that first challenges 
freedom, as in heidegger or Sartre, but also in view of a “secondary passivity”, 
that affects the very interaction between freedom and its determinant 
circumstances.
86  Sartre (1992), p. 486.
87  heidegger (1967), p. 384 (english translation, p. 351f.).
88  husserl explicitly addresses acts of “striking” or “dancing” as cogitationes; see husserl (1952), 
p. 218 (english translation: p. 230).
89  husserl (1952), p. 338 (english translation: p. 350).
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